IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING

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: 12-20834 : (Chapter 7)

RICH GLOBAL, LLC,

:

Debtor.

U.S. Bankruptcy Court 2120 Capitol Avenue

6th Floor

Cheyenne, WY 82001

July 11, 2013

## TELEPHONIC HEARING RE: TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT; AND OBJECTIONS THERETO

BEFORE THE HONORABLE PETER J. McNIFF, JUDGE

## APPEARANCES:

Chapter 7 Trustee: TRACY ZUBROD, ESQ.

1907 House Avenue Cheyenne, WY 82001

For Debtor: MARK E. MACY, ESQ.

217 West 18th Street Cheyenne, WY 82001

For Rich Dad Operating JOHN F. YOUNG, ESQ.

Company: 1700 Lincoln St., Ste. 1400

Denver, CO 80203

For Robert and Kim JENNY M.F. FUJII, ESQ.

Kiyosaki: 303 E. 17th Ave., Ste. 500

Denver, CO 80203

PAUL HUNTER, ESQ. 2616 Central Avenue

Cheyenne, WY 82001

For Learning Annex, JAMES R. BELCHER, ESQ. et al.: 237 Storey Blvd., Ste. 110

Cheyenne, WY 82009

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## PROCEEDINGS

(Court called to order)

THE COURT: Good morning, this is Judge McNiff.

This is our first 8:30 matter today. The case is 12-20834. This is Chapter 7. The name of the case is Rich Global, LLC.

The particular matter before the Court today is a hearing on the Trustee's Motion to Approve the Settlement. We have an objection filed by Rich Dad Operating Company, an objection filed by Mr. and Mrs. Kiyosaki, and I believe we have an objection filed by Learning Annex, et al.

And so what we need to do is to get the appearances of the parties. Let's -- let's begin with counsel for the movant here, and our trustee, Ms. Zubrod.

MS. ZUBROD: Good morning, Your Honor. Tracy Zubrod, Chapter 7 Trustee, 1907 House Avenue, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82001, phone number is, 307-778-2557.

THE COURT: Thank you. On behalf of Rich Dad. I believe it's Mr. Young this morning.

MR. YOUNG: Good morning, Your Honor. John Young on behalf of Rich Dad Operating Company. My address is 1700 Lincoln Street, Denver, Colorado.

THE COURT: All right. On behalf of Mr. and Mrs. Kiyosaki, we know that Ms. Fujii is with us today and Mr. Hunter, I believe. Who's going to handle the matter?

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              MS. FUJII: Good morning, Your Honor. Jenny Fujii
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     appearing on behalf of Robert and Kim Kiyosaki. I believe
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     that our office will handle the matter this morning.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Are you with us, Mr. Hunter?
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              MR. HUNTER: Yes, thank you, Your Honor. Would you
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     like me to enter my appearance?
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              THE COURT: I would.
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              MR. HUNTER: Okay. Paul Hunter appears as counsel
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     for the Kiyosakis. My address is 2616 Central Avenue here
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     in Cheyenne, Wyoming.
                            Thank you.
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              THE COURT: We have another opposing party here,
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     Learning Annex et al. I believe that's Mr. Belcher, please.
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              MR. BELCHER: Good morning, Your Honor.
     Belcher with the law firm Belcher & Boomgaarden, LLP, 237
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     Storey Boulevard, Suite 110, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82009.
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     Learning Annex does not oppose this, Your Honor. Learning
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     Annex is a party to the settlement and supports the
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     trustee's Motion.
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              THE COURT: So, you support?
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              MR. BELCHER: Yes.
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              THE COURT: Okay.
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              MR. BELCHER: It filed a reply to the objections of
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     Rich Dad Operating Company and the Kiyosakis.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Well, we'll -- we'll save a spot
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     for you.
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MR. BELCHER: Okay, thank you.

THE COURT: Let's go the -- let's go to the participating debtor here. I believe Mr. Mark Macy's with us today. Mr. Macy?

MR. MACY: Good morning, Your Honor. Mark Macy, 217 West 18th Street, Cheyenne, Wyoming, appearing on behalf of Rich Global, the debtor. We filed a joinder in the objection.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, boy, this is -- this has been quite a deal here. Let's go to Ms. Zubrod first. What have you done, and what has happened, Ms. Zubrod?

MS. ZUBROD: Thank you, Your Honor. The Court might recall, we had a hearing on May 2nd, 2013. And at that time, the estate has moved to abandon the pending litigation that was identified on the Statement of Financial Affairs, and specifically, this appeal, that now we are asking the Court to approve the sale off.

Several parties disagreed at that time with the trustee's motion, some citing the appeal's not property of the estate, other's stating that there's no legal authority to abandon the appeal. And then another said that it's not property because it wasn't identified in the Schedules.

The Court suggested at that hearing that the objecting parties try to purchase the interest, and I think the Court used some phrase such as, if you had skin in the

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game, then you need to pony up. And that's what happened here. The Learning Annex decided to make an offer and has since ponied up to purchase the estate's interest in this estate asset.

I did receive this morning Mr. Macy's objection that he filed sometime last night. I would note since there has been enough time to file a formal response with the Court, that paragraph three of his objection, that there are several misstatements of fact, specifically regarding the bidding procedures for the auction that was to be held.

There were bidding procedures put in place.

Unfortunately, Learning Annex and Rich Dad Operating would

not agree with the procedures. And unless the estate agreed

to follow either one or the other procedures, no one was

going to participate.

And so each side had a nonnegotiable position on the bidding procedures, so that is why the auction never occurred. And I think that when we had the hearing on May 2nd, 2013, Mr. Macy was not present at that hearing, so he would not have had the benefit of the Court's direction regarding trying to sell this asset.

So we're here today, having followed the Court's advice. Learning Annex has made an offer. We're asking the Court to approve that settlement. We think it's in the best interest of the estate to bring in money for the benefit of

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the creditors, even if there are only two creditors that have filed Proofs of Claim in this case. But that is what we're seeking to accomplish today. Thank you.
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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Belcher, in a supporting mode here. Where are we with you, sir?

MR. BELCHER: Well, Your Honor, first off I want to make it clear what's going on here. Learning Annex agreed to settle this litigation. There's been mentioned, both in some of the objections of some of the parties and, if I understood the trustee's comments, on the sale of this asset. It's not an asset, and it's settlement of litigation.

Your Honor, I think Learning Annex's position is discussed in detail in its reply to the Kiyosaki and Rich Dad Operating Company objections. I discovered this morning when I got to work that the debtor had filed an untimely -- untimely objection last night. The trustee's motion set a June 21st written objection deadline, which is weeks ago. So I assume that this is just another one of the Kiyosaki's move to see if they can't lawyer up a little more.

The applicable law that governs this is discussed in Learning Annex's reply, as well as the analysis of the trial court that Rich Dad Operating asked the trustee to appeal. And I'm not going to get into that in detail today.

In summary, this is Learning Annex's position. The

trustee has discretion to settle the appeal, and this Court is only -- its role is not to second guess the trustee's discretion, but to see if the trustee's judgment is reasonable.

Your Honor, if the Court were not to accept the trustee's agreement to enter into the settlement with Learning Annex, it would, first, forego a \$100,000 payment that Learning Annex has offered to settle this; secondly, it would require the estate to fund the cost to appeal; and third, it would delay resolution of this Chapter 7 case.

Your Honor, this appeal is not an asset and Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code standards do not apply. And that -- that discretion about this being an asset was fully briefed in the previous objection by Learning Annex to the trustee's abandonment of this litigation.

Your Honor, further, the auction that now the Kiyosaki Group, which consists of Rich Dad Operating Company, which is both the owner of the debtor, and an alleged creditor, at least it's filed a Proof of Claim, and the Kiyosakis who are not parties—in—interest in this case, Your Honor, they are the owners of Rich Dad Operating. They are not creditors of this debtor, they are not owners of this debtor and, frankly, are not interested parties for that reason, but continue to file things with the Court that they don't — what they are proposing is not the same as

settlement of the litigation. So we're talking about two different things here. They want to treat it as an asset.

I'm going to ask the Court to ignore the debtor's untimely objection for that reason. And there's no opportunity to even explore it. It was filed at 9:00 o'clock last night, but I assume that's just so that the Kiyosakis could have one more set of attorneys participate in the hearing this morning.

Your Honor, I'd like to briefly go through the standards that govern settlement and the citations of law in Learning Annex's reply. The standard is the lowest point in the range of reasonableness. And the factors that the Court is to consider is probably a probability of success on appeal. And the papers that Learning Annex has filed show that statistically less then 10 percent of appeals in the Second Circuit are successful.

The legal arguments that these -- the Kiyosaki group wants the trustee to raise have been twice rejected by the trial court in two separate jury trials, and so they want a third bite at the apple. And the trial court's statements in its order on a -- the Motions to Stay the Judgment, was not high probability of success, whether the Kiyosaki group has misstated what the trial court said, and that court's orders in -- before the Court has been submitted as exhibits by all the parties.

We also have a complexity and expense of litigation, Your Honor, that as I said, this has been to two different juries who ruled that Learning Annex is entitled to \$23 million for wrongful conduct by this debtor in taking the business proposal, and running with it and making profit.

So if you go through two jury trials, Your Honor, it's just an indication of the complexity that's already transpired in this.

Your Honor, this estate also has no funds to fund litigation expense. This is — they have zero dollars in cash. It has some promissory notes that are payable by the Kiyosakis who managed to take all of the cash from this debtor, and also under their control, assigned all of the revenues and all of the assets of this debtor to related parties. So this estate has no money to fund litigation.

The value to the estate by participating and agreeing to the settlement, which the trustee chose to do, with a -- to, in fact, accept the \$100,000 cash payment. So it will actually generate an asset.

The last factor is interest of creditors. The appeal can benefit only one creditor, Your Honor, that's the debtor, and the debtor's owner, Rich Dad Operating Company. They've chose to file for bankruptcy so they can use the 362 stay to avoid posting an appeal bond.

The second aspect of this, Your Honor, is what these parties are proposing is an auction. And again, I want to go back to prior briefing, settlement of an appeal is not estate property. It's been fully briefed in the trustee's abandonment proceedings.

And I might point this out to the Court, Your Honor. The Kiyosakis agreed in their objection to the trustee's abandonment, they said a judgment is a liability of this asset. It's not an asset with any value. Thus, Your Honor, Section 363 approval standards do not apply, and that's the foundation for the objections that they raised before the Court today.

Let me turn to the auction that's been proposed by Rich Dad Operating and the Kiyosakis; it's both unwarranted and improper. What they're proposing to the Court, Your Honor, is that the Court ought to order an auction of this appeal. And, Your Honor, to the best of my knowledge, the only person with standing to appeal are the parties to the underlying litigation, which in this case is the debtor. The debtor cannot, doesn't have any money to not only fund the appeal, but to buy the appeal, to participate.

So what they're suggesting to the Court is that a party that was not a party to the underlying litigation, becomes the party by purchase of this appeal in the Second Circuit. And there's no case law and no authority for that.

Only interested parties have standing to appeal.

And so what they're suggesting to the Court is that the Court allow an auction to go forward and somehow that will give them standing to appeal this in the Second Circuit. And I suggest, Your Honor, there's no authority for that. And that's -- that's why this whole auction concept is just a method that they proposed to see if they can't out-muscle Learning Annex who's had to go through two jury trials to obtain a \$23 million judgment.

I mentioned to the Court, and I'd refer the Court to Docket No. 71 where the Kiyosakis took the position that this litigation is claims against the estate. And I'm going to quote what they said to the Court on that, Your Honor. They said, "Litigation has no monetary value to the estate." Now, they said that in May and now they've got the opposite view. And so the Court should just be aware that they're changing their spots.

I might also point out, I think the trustee used the phrase that the Court suggested, having skin in the game. Your Honor, Rich Dad Operating suggested in a letter to the trustee that they would indemnify the estate for costs and expense of litigation. They did not make any offer to the estate to give money to the estate. They only said, well, we will protect you from reasonable costs of appeal.

Reasonable cost of appeal is meaningless. The estate doesn't have cash to pay the costs and attorneys' fees, and that would expose the estate to unrecoverable costs and expenses if there was a dispute over reasonableness. So if they got into that and someone would define that some of the costs or expenses that the estate incurred were not reasonable, then the estate would be in a position where it had suffered costs and expenses on this appeal that it couldn't recover.

And so what we have is, in concept, nothing more than a facade by Rich Dad Operating saying, well, you go ahead and do this and we'll protect you, but only if we determine that it's reasonable.

The last thing I think along those lines, Your
Honor, there was some mention by Ms. Zubrod of the history
of the auction in this case. Rich Dad Operating and the
Kiyosakis want to dictate what and how the trustee makes and
accepts offers.

The last time we went down this road, the trustee offered to sell promissory notes payable by the Kiyosakis, and my client was willing to purchase those and -- Kiyosakis and Rich Dad's, so they wouldn't participate because there weren't some releases of third parties involved in the auction. And so it failed of -- of its own weight.

So I guess to summarize, Your Honor, settlement is

in the best interest of the estate, just as the trustee and Learning Annex have agreed. They've allowed \$100,000 in cash. It will eliminate any expense to the estate. It will eliminate delay in administering the case, and it will provide certainty.

The debtor's twice made arguments that it wants to make the Appellate Court. It's twice made that in the trial court and been rejected, and less than 10 percent of Second Circuit appeals are successful.

Consequently, Your Honor, Learning Annex asks the Court to approve the trustee's Motion to Approve Settlement.

THE COURT: All right. I turn to Mr. Young, please.

MR. YOUNG: Thank you, Judge. First of all, the objection by Rich Dad Operating Company is essentially two-fold. One, because the motion is framed as a motion under Rule 9019 as a Motion to Approve the Settlement, the trustee and the Court ultimately needs to have evidence before it to support the settlement, and Rich Dad Operating Company objects on the basis that there's just insufficient evidence at this point to approve the settlement.

There's been no explanation or evidence put forward as to why \$100,000 is an appropriate settlement figure in regard to this appeal of the judgment of Learning Annex. So the parties and the Court is just left to guess as to how

this \$100,000 figure was arrived at and what, you know, what went into the determination of that figure.

There's also no evidence or explanation before the Court and the creditors here as to what the trustee views as the costs and expense of pursuing the appeal. So what -- what is being -- there's no explanation as to what's being saved in deciding not to pursue the appeal.

And then, as Mr. Belcher has eluded to and as we have set forth in our objection, the Rich Dad Operating Company is offering to reimburse the estate, or indemnify the estate, for the fees and costs incurred in pursuing the appeal. And we're kind of at a loss to understand why we haven't received any inquiries as to why the trustee wouldn't pursue that avenue. We sent a letter, but simply have not received any inquiries or response as to the pursuit of that appeal and our offer to reimburse the estate for that.

Mr. Belcher also references that it's not really a hard offer, but the letter sets forth the offer. And second of all, he claims that the estate would be incurring costs and would have no money to pay those costs, but the mechanisms in the bankruptcy case would be such that if the appeal were pursued, the attorney pursuing that appeal obviously would need to file fee applications with this Court and there would be a determination as to the

reasonableness of the fees, and the Rich Dad Operating
Company offer incorporates that concept when it says, we
will indemnify the estate for reasonable fees.

So it's an offer, and it's an offer that we don't think has been considered in this process. And frankly, given that there's two competing offers in regard to the appeal, we believe the better approach in this case, and the analysis that should be undertaken is more along the lines of a 363 sale.

And -- but there should be at least a consideration or procedures put in place so that a competing offer can be made for this right to appeal the judgment by the debtor.

And we don't think that there's been sufficient consideration of competing offers in this -- in regard to this appeal. And there's should be some procedure where the other folks, like my client and the Kiyosakis, could participate in a process that would maximize the value of this appeal to the estate instead of just a one-sided settlement process where none of the other participants get to participate, and it's only up or down approval of a settlement agreement.

So for the reasons set forth in our objection, we think the better approach is for the trustee to consider competing proposals for this right to appeal. And also we don't believe there is sufficient evidence before the Court

a this point to approve the settlement motion that's before the Court. So Rich Dad Operating Company would request that this Court deny the motion at this time.

THE COURT: Ms. Fujii, please.

MS. FUJII: Thank you, Your Honor. Much ado has been made about whether or not the Kiyosakis have standing to even object to the proposed settlement agreement in this case. And as Your Honor probably knows, based upon all the documents and pleadings filed in this case, the Kiyosakis are the owner of the creditor, Rich Dad Operating Company. And as equity holders of a creditor in a case in which the trustee is attempting to generate funds or surplus in distributions to the estate, we believe the Kiyosakis do have standing in order to maximize the value to the estate.

And I believe, Your Honor, what's evident from the objections filed by Rich Dad Operating Company, is that the trustee really hasn't looked very carefully or didn't appear to have analyzed the merits of the appeal on a subjective standard. What she's done, as far as I can tell, is look at the statistics.

Well, less than 10 percent of the appeals in the Second Circuit have been overturned, and that might be true. But the true analysis, Your Honor, I believe, is -- is that the trustee has a duty to the estate to really analyze what these claims are in the appeal and not just go by an

objective standard of what is the percentage of appeals that are successful in this particular court. I don't think that's proper. And I think really the trustee has not set forth her true arguments as to why the \$100,000 settlement is sufficient and is the true fair market value of this particular claim.

Now the Learning Annex also argues that this -this is not property of the estate. The trustee's interest
in the appeal is not something that can be sold. Well, the
trustee herself, in her Motion for Sale, she refers to this
particular interest of the debtor as an interest -- she says
in paragraph 4 of her motion, that the trustee proposes to
blend in any interest that the bankruptcy estate may have in
certain litigation. She also refers in paragraph 9 of her
motion that the estate has the right of an appeal.

So the trustee's own terminology of what, in fact, she is settling, appears to be somewhat in terms of being an asset of the estate. I don't know if the Court has actually determined whether or not this is an asset of the estate. I think what's most important here is that the Court needs to look at whether or not all of the factors on whether the settlement is reasonable or not, and whether all of factors have been analyzed by the trustee.

Learning Annex argues that the settlement will be great for the estate because it will eliminate any

administrative costs relating to the appeal. Well, as testified by Mr. Young, as stated by him just a few minutes ago, the Rich Dad Operating Company was willing to cover the reasonable costs of the appeal as set forth through a fee application process in the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate.

So really if the Court denies approval of the settlement agreement, it doesn't -- it's not going to cost the estate anything to pursue the appeal. So I think that that statement that the settlement agreement is going to eliminate administrative costs really has no bearing in this matter based upon the fact that the costs are going to be covered by a third party.

The last thing I want to say, Your Honor, is that based upon the trustee's duty to maximize recovery for all creditors in this case, that the Court should either deny approval of the settlement agreement outright and/or set forth some kind of procedure to see what the maximum value of this particular interest that the estate has in the appeal is, and really generate the fair market value. The Court really shouldn't allow the trustee to sell this particular interest of the estate at a lowball offer instead of setting forth procedures to maximize the value.

And apparently there has been some issues with the trustee, Ms. Zubrod, in setting forth auctioning procedures. So if, in fact, Your Honor goes down that road of requiring

an auction, I think the parties could request the Court's assistance in setting forth some of the standards in order to actually facilitate the auction.

Based upon that, Your Honor, the Kiyosakis believe that the settlement agreement should not be approved, first off. And second, if this Court believes that the claim has any value and if Learning Annex believes that, you know, this \$100,000 is the best and most fair way to settle the claims of the estate, then truly set it out for bidding process and generate and see how much funds this particular claim of the estate can generate for all the creditors.

Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm kind of at a loss, Ms. Fujii, I thought that's what we did.

MS. FUJII: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Well, it's just a comment.

Let's go to Mr. Macy. And I know that Mr. Macy's position here is opposed by Mr. Belcher. I'm going to overrule Mr. Belcher's oral motion to not allow Mr. Macy's input here, because I believe that we're in the beginning of this situation.

It involves, apparently, a great deal of money and a great deal of gnashing of teeth, et cetera. And I believe that the Court needs all the information it can get. But I would indicate to Mr. Macy that this is an exception, not a

rule. Mr. Macy?

MR. MACY: Thank you, Your Honor. And I appreciate the opportunity here, and I apologize for filing this late. The -- it's one of those situations where you wake up in the middle of the night and you find an argument that may make sense in this and for the benefit of the parties here.

We didn't advance any new arguments that had not already been made and I won't readdress those. The only argument that was new on our part is the issue of whether or not the sale of an appeal is against public policy.

From our standpoint, Your Honor, and contrary to the Learning Annex's claim, we do operate independently of any other parties. My contact has been solely with my people at Rich Global. And so our issue is that a sale of an appeal really is against public policy.

There are -- I've cited some brief authority in which -- the cases in which appeals or causes of actions have been held to be against public policy.

And the basis of our argument here is that it takes away Rich Global's ability to fight on the underlying merits. The sale of ability to -- to end the litigation where on appeal it could be heard on the merits, and where the judge has said that there is a viable and -- viable action on appeal.

We think it should go forward on our part. And the

reason why, of course, is because the appeal, if successful, could end certainly a large amount of the debtor's liability and that is significant. And it's not every -- it's not every day that cases on appeal aren't overturned. There are several. And I think every attorney in this proceeding has won a case on appeal.

So without advancing the -- and without reiterating the other arguments, I would just point the Court to a couple of situations where public policy, the facts on public policy which we cited in our brief, is a situation in which a debtor had a medical -- or had a legal malpractice claim against -- against a certain attorney. And the insurance company for that attorney actually bought that legal malpractice case. And in that case, the court said that that was against public policy and should be considered that, because it's taking away the debtor's right to appeal that or the -- taking that right away from him really is gerrymandering the rights of the parties and shouldn't be allowed.

So there are situations in which the Court should consider whether or not the appeal should be sold at all.

And we just ask that the Court consider that in its final determination on whether to approve this settlement.

That's all I have, Your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Well, Ms. Zubrod, I'm going

to give you an opportunity to briefly reiterate your thoughts after hearing what the parties have stated.

Ms. Zubrod, please?

MS. ZUBROD: Yes, Your Honor.

Again, I think the Court made it very clear, it came across to me loud and clear, that if folks were interested in purchasing this asset or interest of the estate, this litigation or appeal, then they needed to make an offer.

And the estate received that offer from Learning Annex. And there were numerous discussions back and forth about that number, and nobody else approached the estate, except for Rich Dad, but they -- they didn't come forward with an offer, per se.

If Learning Annex and the estate, we're talking in terms of apples and apples, they came to the table with an orange and it just, quite frankly, it just didn't make any sense.

The estate is always happy to take as much as possible to, as Ms. Fujii said, maximize recovery for the creditors. That's what the estate is in the business of doing. And Learning Annex came to the table to do that and no one else did.

And so we're here to ask the Court to allow that settlement to proceed so that we can get on with the

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administration of this case.

THE COURT: Well, thank you all very much. been an interesting morning. We will, of course, take now what we've heard in the presentations and all of the things that have been sent to us and make our decision. And we'll take it under advisement and we'll issue our order in due course.

Thank you all very much, I appreciate it. We'll be at recess.

(Hearing adjourned at 11:10 a.m.)

## CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing is a correct partial transcript from the electronically recorded TELEPHONIC HEARING RE: TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO APPROVE SETTLEMENT; AND OBJECTIONS THERETO, held on July 11, 2013, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, 2120 Capitol Avenue, 6th Floor, Cheyenne, WY 82001, in the above-entitled matter.

August 9, 2013

Verbatim Digital Reporting, LLC

3317 W. Layton Ave. Englewood, CO 80110 (303) 915-1677